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Introduction
In safety critical situations such as the rail, aerospace and automotive [1] [2] [3] [4] and medical and nuclear 5, 6 industries it is quite common to replicate components important to the safety of a system in a redundant block. Such components are run in parallel so that a failure of one does not prevent the overall system from continuing to function correctly. Often the configuration of the block is triplex (three parallel units) or quadruplex (four parallel units). The well known Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), which involves three parallel components together with a voting system, is a simple example of such systems.
Complete system failure of a triplex configured system only occurs when all three components are simultaneously failed, however the system may be regarded as "unsafe" with two failed components. In this case the remaining functioning component allows the system to be closed-down safely for a complete system repair, generally for which it will be taken out of service. This situation with two failed components corresponds to what might be called an operational failure rather than a (much more dangerous) full system failure and corresponds to 2-out-of-3:G logic. A variety of software control systems also work in a similar manner; for example HP"s NonStop server 7 or the Space Shuttle"s quad-redundant network 8 , in which respectively three and four identical, independent boards perform the same calculations and at the end compare notes to see if any board is out of line with the rest. The aim of such redundancy is that faults may be identified and then isolated. HP"s literature claims 99.99999% up-time for NonStop server running the TMR option 7 . Availability estimates such as these naturally require assumptions regarding the failure rates of the redundant components and the manner in which they are repaired.
As a simple example of what we are considering in this paper, suppose that a subsystem reliability block, consisting of three microcontrollers, is implementing a 2-out-of-3:G procedure 9 whilst being cooled by a fan. It is also supposed that the controllers are simple to replace (component repair) and if one fails, for whatever reason, it may be replaced within some small time period . It is assumed that the operation performed by the controllers is of sufficient importance that running the entire system with only one functioning microcontroller is thought to be too dangerous, so that the system would be shut down in such circumstances and undergo a complete repair (system repair). Thus, this particular mode of system failure will be deemed to have occurred when two of the three microcontrollers are failed simultaneously, leading to the 2-outof-3:G logic. If the fan"s function starts to degrade, so that its cooling effect on the controllers reduces, then the temperature of the controllers will increase and many of their failure modes will be accelerated. In some ways this is equivalent to what happens during a progressive accelerated life test (PALT), and we may describe component failures by a time-varying force of mortality on the controllers, according to some function (t). To be clear, (t) is defined such that the probability of each of the controllers failing in the (small) time interval (t, t + dt), whether for the first time or not, given it is functioning at time t, is equal to (t)dt + O(dt 2 ). Two further things are assumed here: the first is that such failures are assumed not to be common cause failures, they are accelerated by the same common mechanism (increasing temperature here), but the actual failures of the three controller remain quite independent, although the failures occur at an accelerated rate. In other words, (T) is a function of the local temperature T(t), and this temperature is varying with time. The second assumption is that the age of the controllers does not contribute to the time-varying mortality so in this regard the replaced components are neither necessarily as-good-as-new nor as-bad-as-old, but merely as-good-as-the-others. The distinction here being that a new replacement and a resuscitated old component act in the same manner as their force of mortality is determined by the fan, and not by their own age. Such a situation may arise if replacing the fan is not a realistic option, through being too costly or too involved a procedure. Component ageing may be neglected by implementing a preventative maintenance schedule that requires components to undergo an initial burn-in process off-line and also requires them to be replaced before they age significantly, a version of the standard age replacement preventative maintenance policy 9 . This ensures each component operates at
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the (assumed) flat bottom of their bathtub curve. As a maintenance policy this is not unreasonable, if the purpose of the redundant components is sufficiently important to the system that it is worth the cost of the policy"s implementation.
The above example is obviously somewhat contrived, and perhaps a more realistic case would be that of the multiplexing of brake actuators on railway sets where a train"s workload may act as the factor accelerating actuator failures. Likewise the failure modes of a variety of electrical systems may be accelerated by workload (for example current density accelerating Electromigration failures), mechanical stress, temperature or even by the weather (e.g. humidity) 10 . It is important to reiterate that the failures are accelerated (or perhaps even decelerated) by these changing conditions, still independent, but occurring at a rate which is changing in time. They are not common cause events which would imply that the probability of components failures are statistically dependent on one another.
A second case, which is covered by the same analysis, is that of a 2-out-of-3:G subsystem operating under a minimal repair maintenance policy 9 , where the actuators (for example) are merely quickly patched up and put back into service. In this maintenance scheme components are repaired rather than being replaced. Their failure rate after repair is assumed to be the same as it was just before the failure. If the repair time is relatively small, then the failure rates of all components may be assumed to be equal. In this system the components are assumed to each fail according to an independent nonhomogeneous Poisson process (or NHPP), determined by the same parameter (t). To be definite, by (t) we mean the instantaneous rate of change of M(t), the expected value E(n(t)) of the number n(t) of failures of a given component in the time interval (0, t], i.e. the failure rate of the process 11 . As simultaneous failures of a given component can be assumed not to occur, the probability of failure of a particular component in the time interval (t, t + dt) is given by
In addition the process is assumed to be a regular one (continuous M(t) and possessing independent increments, i.e. for any j, k, Pr{n(t) = k| t  A} is independent of Pr{n(t) = j| t  B} if A  B = , see for example Ref. 12) so that (t), the rate of occurrence of failure (rocof), is identical to the force of mortality of the first failure time 10 . Thus, if a component is working at time t, the probability of it working throughout the interval [t, t+s), i.e. its conditional survival probability at time t + s, is
where R C (t) is the absolute reliability (= R C (t|0)) of the component, assuming it was working at time t = 0. Eq. (1) will be used throughout (e.g. eqs. (12) - (15)), in general though it will be useful to condition on, for example, the time of the most recent component failure.
In a minimal repair policy the repair time is ignored 9 (i.e. the repairs are treated as
Instantaneous and the process is a point one), however this idealisation is generally assumed to be valid if the repair time is sufficiently small. Strictly applied, our 2-out-of-3:G redundant system with minimal repair would fail with probability zero. Consequently to be realistic we assume here that the repair time  is small enough that minimal repair remains roughly valid, and with it the use of three identical, independent NHPP failures flows, however we shall be interested in how the reliability measures for the system vary with this (small) repair time. This mild contradiction only arises in the minimal repair case and not in the accelerated failure case. So, when modelling minimal repair, it will be important to be precise in the statement of any results. The likelihood is though that, provided (t) does not change appreciably on a timescale of  (e.g. if |(t+) -(t)| << (t) or roughly  |dlog((t))/dt| << 1), our results will give accurate results in both cases.
If safety of the system is paramount, and if the components are simple to replace, it will be useful for the Maintenance Engineers to work within some timeframe , which is the maximum allowed interval for component replacement from the time of failure. We assume, as a worst case, that all repairs take exactly the allowed time  and ask the question: How do system reliability measures depend upon the (now deterministic) repair time ? As well as being useful information for the defining of repair schemes, it is rather more realistic than assuming exponentially distributed repair time, yet avoids the need to specify a particular distribution. To summarize, our assumptions are that:
(1) the reliability of the triplex block is determined by three independent failure flows described by identical NHPP flows with rocof (t). The time-dependence of the rocof could be either due to a time-dependent acceleration factor or due to component ageing in a minimal repair system; (2) each component repair completes (as a worst case) exactly a time  after the component failed. Note that the time  includes the transportation time as well as the actual repair once an engineer is on site. Assumption 2 needs some clarification and is assumed here to apply irrespective of the number of components in repair. For example in a 2-out -of-N:G system, in this worst case calculation, if two items are in repair, having failed at times t 1 and t 2 (where necessarily t 1  t 2  t 1 + ), a maintenance team is assumed to repair the first failed item at t = t 1 +  and a second team repairs the second item at time t = t 2 + . Such repairs may occur sooner, but as safety is presumed to be paramount this worst case is taken. This necessarily means that there are two maintenance teams available for the repairs of a quad system and N -2 teams in the general N-plexed case. Using the language of Queuing Theory [13] [14] [15] , the general N-redundant system is modelled by 2-out-of-N:G logic, with an M(t)/D/N-2 queue. In addition we assume: (3) the system is completely observable, so that repairs begin immediately;
2-out-of-N:G systems with NHPP flows 5 (4) repairs are conducted in-service provided that there are at least two functioning components. Should only one component be functioning the system is shut down and an operational system failure is said to have occurred.
A study of the time-to-first-(system) failure (TTF) is analytically equivalent to the case of a similar system without system repair. Consequently, it makes sense to discuss the first system failure in terms of a system hazard function h S (t), a TTFF failure distribution f S (t) and a ("non-repairable") reliability function R S (t). The time-to-secondfailure of the system (and indeed all future failures) may be obtained from this, e.g. the reliability function for second failure, given the first occurred at t = t 1 , is
Consequently, our aim in this paper is to obtain the distribution of the time-to-firstfailure of the system as a function of the allowed (component) repair time  and in addition expressions for R S (t) and h S (t). As a special case we also consider the important case when the failures are described by homogeneous Poisson process (HPP), i.e. where the rocof is constant ((t) = ). The mean TTFF (or MTTFF), equal to the mean time between failures (MTBF), is then also of particular interest. If we label the hazard function with HPP failures by h S0 (,), we wish also to compare the values of h S (t) and h S0 ((t),) (i.e. the HPP result with  replaced by (t), the rocof for the NHPP) as it has been suggested that, under certain conditions, including the small  limit assumed here, they should be the same 16 . Specifically, the region of parameter space closest to what might be expected of a system in which safety is paramount, is that of small (t), i.e. fast repair. In the HPP case of (t) =  (say), then in the limit   0, asymptotic reliability theory (see e.g. Refs. 16-21; in particular the review article Ref. 20) demonstrates, using renewal theory, that the TTFF distribution is asymptotically exponential with some system hazard rate h S0 = h S0 (,). In addition, Solov"yev and Zaytsev have studied 16 the k-redundant cold standby problem, with a non-stationary (NHPP) flows (t), in a particular asymptotic limit. To avoid anomalous behaviour † they were forced to take the small (t) limit in the following rather unusual manner. Unable to take the general limit (t)  0, they introduce a small parameter   0, and two fixed functions,  0 (t) and  0 , independent of  so that  0 (t) 0 ~ O(1). They then consider the limit
In this case they show, for the k-redundant system (with a time varying (t)), that the failure rate at time t, may be † In Ref [16] a partition of the interval [0, t) is first defined and the conditional system reliability is bounded in each of the resulting sub-divisions. This introduces a second limit, in addition to the limit   0, as the norm on the partition must also be allowed to approach zero. Difficulties arise with this method since it is necessary to swap the order of these limits, and the conditions imposed on (t) and  above are required in order to make this legitimate. Without such conditions, it is possible that when the dt  0 limit is taken the result may not be Riemann-integrable.
obtained from the instantaneous value of the exponent obtained from the stationary problem, i.e. from h S (t) = h S0 ((t),). They conjecture that this may be a general result, but add that it will probably require additional conditions on (t) (such as the condition here that (t) =  0 (t)/ k   in the   0 limit) 16 .
The Triplex (2-out-of-3:G) System
Despite the NHPP flows, the system may be described by a state label k equal to the number of components in repair. The state transition diagram in the triplex case (i.e. 2-out-of-3:G here) is shown in Fig. (1) 
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. At time t = 0 we assume the system has no failed items and is consequently in state k = 0. If at time t the system makes its first transition from state k = 1 to state k = 2 then it fails and the TTFF is t. As it is the distribution of TTFF that we seek here, there is no system repair from state k = 2 to k = 0. The analysis is more complicated that standard analysis based on Markov chains, as the state k = 1, which has a single component in repair, is a parameterised state with parameter x equal to the remaining repair time. As a result, the complete state of the system is described by k, and if k = 1, by the remaining repair time x also. Note that it is possible to unravel the k = 1 state, approximately, into a large number M (say) of states, denoted by the set S 1 = {(k = 1, x = m/M)} for 1  m  M. It is clear that the unravelled set of states S = {(k = 0)}  S 1  {(k = 2)} has the Markov property that for any set of strictly increasing times t j , Pr{s(t j+1 ) = s j+1 | s(t j ) = s j , s(t j-1 ) = s j-1 , …, s(t 0 ) = s 0 } = Pr(s(t j+1 ) = s j+1 | s(t j ) = s j } for any s k  S. In the limit of large M, the mean value of the exponentially distributed sojourn times, in each state in S 1 , ~ /M,  0 and the states in S 1 all become instantaneous. We proceed slightly differently maintaining the continuous parameter x, however the probabilities P k (t), that the system is in state k at time t, remain the main interest. When k = 1 we also define a density function over x  [0, ], labelled p 1 (t,x), such that the probability that the system is in state k = 1 at time t, and has an item in repair with a remaining repair time in the range (x, x + dx), is given by p 1 (t,x)dx. Then P 1 (t) is the integral of p 1 (t,x) over all x  [0,]. If a single component in a fully functioning system fails at time t the system will enter the state k = 1 and will have an item with a remaining repair time of . Thus p 1 (t,)dx, the probability of being in state k = 1 with an item with a remaining repair time in the range ( -dx, ), will be determined both by P 0 (t) and by the probability 3(t)dx that one of the three NHPPs generates a failure in the time interval (t, t + dx). Thus p 1 (t,)dx = P 0 (t)  3(t)dx or
Likewise a system in state k = 1 at time t, which has an item with a remaining repair time in the region (0, dt), will make a transition to the state k = 0 within the time interval (t, t + dt) and this will tend to increase P 0 (t), thus
Similarly the probability of being in state k = 1 at t + dt, with an item in repair with a remaining repair time in the range (x -dt, x -dt + dx), is determined by the probability that it was in the state k = 1 at time t, with a remaining repair time in the range (x, x + dx), provided that a second component failure did not occur in the interval (t,t + dt). I.e.
or, from Taylor"s theorem,
With no system repair from state k = 2, we have simply
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Integrating eq. (7) over 0 ≤ x ≤  and adding the result to eqs. (9) and (5), and using the result from eq. (3), demonstrates the conservation of probability, P 0 (t) + P 1 (t) + P 2 (t) = 1.
For a general 2-out-of-N:G system, states k = 1, 2, …, N -2 will be similarly parameterised (only with k parameters), while the states k = 0 and k = N -1 will not. Generally the factor of three in eqs. (3) and (5) will be replaced by N, and a partial differential equation (pde) such as eq. (7) will be required for the parameterised states. In the triplex case here eq. (7) can be integrated along the characteristic  = t -x (or merely by substitution of eq. (10) into eq. (7)) to give
where eq. (1) has be used for R C (t). Note that as p 1 (t,x) is a continuous function of its arguments, eq. (10) implies that C(t) is also. It will now useful to define a function Q(t) = C(t)/3(t)R C (t). Then using eq. (3), P 0 (t) = Q(t)R 3 C (t), and in eq. (5), with p 1 (t,0) = 3( t -
Assuming that the initial system is in state k = 0 at t = 0, it is clear that Q(t) = 0 for t < 0, and Q(t) = 1 for all 0  t  . Note that setting (t) = 0, R C (t) = 1 and Q(t) = 0 for -  t < 0, Q(0) = 1 as the history for eq. (11) and integrating also gives this result and this latter will be the chosen as the start condition for the numerical integration discussed below. We wish to set up the system equations for a general 2-out-of-N:G system and it is with this in mind that the triplex system has been solved in the manner that it has. However there are other, simpler routes to eq. (11) which will help to justify the method. For example, as for this TTFF calculation, there are no in-service repairs from state k = 2, the system may only be in the state k = 1 at time t if it was in state k = 0 at time t 1 (such that t 1 > t -), an item failed at that time and the other two devices survived from t 1 to t. I.e.
which is essentially eq. (10) integrated over all x. Similarly the only way the system can be in state k = 0 at time t is if it has always been in state k = 0 or if it last returned from state k = 1 at time t 1 and has remained there ever since. If it returned from k =1 at time t 1 , then it must have been in state k = 0 at time t 1 -, at which point a failure occurred, the
2-out-of-N:G systems with NHPP flows 9
two remaining devices survived from t 1 - to t 1 , and finally the three good devices survived from t 1 to t, thus
Consequently, changing variables in the integral,
Differentiating eq. (14) then gives eq. (11).
Eq. (11) 
on t  (, 2]. The Method of Steps demonstrates that a solution to eq. (11) exists, and, with the continuity of C(t) and hence of Q(t), that that solution is also unique. However the need for repeated integration makes it difficult to generate a solution with this method except in the very simplest of cases, unless either the repair time  is large compared to typical values of 1/(t), or t is of the order of a few . Neither condition is likely to be of interest here; and in addition a solution valid for long times is important. We have assumed in the above description of the system that the rocof (t) is not state-dependent, i.e. one failed item does not alter the rocof of the others. This is not strictly necessary, and different values of (t) may easily be introduced into eqs. (5) and (7).
In systems in which safety is important it is expected that the allowed repair time will be small compared to typical values of 1/(t). First order DDEs with constant coefficients (i.e. , eq. (11) with (t) constant) have been considered by Driver et al. 25 , with a small delay time . They find that for certain conditions on these constant coefficients, corresponding here to the value of   3exp() < exp(1), the asymptotic behaviour of the solution of an equation such as eq. (11) is the same as that obtained by taking the first Taylor approximation 10 Dwyer, Goodall and Dixon
It is well known (e.g. Ref. 26 ) that such approximations are not generally valid, and certainly any hopeful attempt at increasing the accuracy of the solution, for larger  values, by using higher order Taylor series, may fail through the introduction of oscillatory behaviour. However it is certainly worthwhile considering a similar approximation here, when eq. (11) in terms of C(t) reduces to the ordinary differential equation (ODE),
This may be integrated without any further approximation to give
If we use the normalisation constraint that f S (t) should integrate to one, rather than say the behaviour at t = 0 to determine the integration constant, a simple analysis shows that c = 1/. In this case the cumulative distribution function F S (t) and the reliability R S (t) are then
Constant 
If the rocof is constant, i.e. the failure flows are generated by HPPs, an exact solution to eq. (11) may be obtained, although the notation is simplified by introducing the dimensionless parameter  = 3exp(), then with R C (t) = exp(-t), eq. (11) becomes
If the initial state is k = 0, the initial data is Q(0) = 1 and Q(t) = 0 for -  t < 0, as above.
The zeros of the denominator are determined by the Lambert W-function 27 , defined such . Note as  is real, properties of W(x) ensure that s m and s -m are complex conjugates 27 . Consequently, from eq. (21) the failure time pdf is
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for t > 0. The t = 0 value of the infinite series in eq. (22) must be understood to represent the limit t  0+; the sum of the series for Q(t) obtained by setting t = 0 before performing the sum will give an erroneous value of ½ rather than 1. The expression in eq. (22) is dominated by the first term corresponding to m = 0. The "exact" distribution (including terms in the sum up to m = 400) is shown as the solid curve in Fig. (2) , for  = 0.1. Also shown in the same figure is the dominant (m = 0) term (dotted curve) and only those terms in eq. (22) corresponding to m = 0, 1 (dashed curve). It is clear from Fig.(2) that, to capture the behaviour for t close to 0, requires a large number of terms from the sum, but only a small number (one or perhaps two terms) is enough for the majority of the time. It is this behaviour, that dictated the manner in which c was chosen in eq. (18) .
Examining the pole behaviour as  is decreased demonstrates that the real pole closest to 3 dominates the failure time distribution, Fig. (3) . In the case of fast repair, i.e. small , the dominant pole 
(1 -4)t)
. This analysis is also consistent with work on fast repair in reliability problems which predicts that, in the limit of small repair times, the failure time distribution should be asymptotically exponential [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . The value of 1/MTTFF in this case is clearly 6 2 (1 -4) in the small  limit. We 
Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process NHPP
For the non-stationary process eq. (11) must be solved with time-varying R C (t) and (t). A familiar step in reliability analysis might be to consider, say, the case of a Weibull distribution as a source of the time-varying rocof, essentially choosing R C (t) for its simplicity, and to solve for f S (t) in that case. However, in view of the sophistication of the analysis, it is perhaps more expedient to progress in a slightly different way. Define first the intermediate function 
The equation in R C (t) is an advanced-DDE while that in Q(t) is a retarded-DDE. The pair, eqs. (26), come from adjoint classes, and have been analysed [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] (in pairs) for a variety of functions (t). The background to this work is again that of the Number Theoretical analysis of prime numbers in which the DDEs developed relate to sieve methods. If, instead of R C (t) or (t), it is (t) that is now chosen for expedience, so that eqs. (31) are most easily solved, the adjoint nature of eqs. (26i) and (26ii) allows the single component reliability function R C (t), that gives rise to that (t), (and through that (t)) to be solved at the same time as Q(t). However analytical solutions to eqs. (26) only exist in a small number of special cases [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . Bradley and others [29] [30] [31] [32] have considered the case a t b ) t (    (27) which corresponds to a rocof (t) decreasing with time roughly as b/(t + a + b), while de Bruijn has analysed 28 the case ) t exp( ) t (      which gives rise to a roughly linearly increasing (t). The complexity of the analysis in each case (respectively Refs 29-32, and Ref. 28 ) demonstrates clearly that finding analytical solutions to even the most trivial differential-difference equations (DDEs) is extremely difficult. In addition, the form of the solutions obtained is not simple. As a result numerical techniques offer the best options. Such problems can also be difficult to solve numerically, however Shampine 33, 34 has developed a MATLAB programme (ddesd) devoted to the solution of DDEs. Shampine"s programme uses standard Runge-Kutta methods and proceeds in time-steps controlled by the current estimate of the size of the residual error.
Eq. (11) may be written in terms of C(t) and f S (t) as the matrix equation
where All that is required are functions (lambda(u) and lambda_dot(u)) defining the rocof (t) and its derivative and the single component reliability RC(u)defining R C (t). Fig. (6) shows the TTFF distribution obtained from the DDE solver. It turns out that the quadruplexed system is much more complex than this due to the M(t)/D/2 queuing and results for that case will be considered elsewhere. For now we turn our attention to obtaining approximate results for the general 2-out-of-N:G case for NHPP flows for the small (t), for which we shall regard the N = 3 case as a specific example.
The General 2-out-of-N:G case with NHPP flows.
In the 2-out-of-N:G system, the system is again described by the state probabilities P k (t) that there are k items in repair at time t. We denote, for each state k  0, N-1, the vector of ordered remaining component repair times by
, and define the density functions
, such that the probability the system has k items in repair, with an associated emaining repair time vector in the range )
In this way the item with remaining repair time x 1 is the item which will be returned to service first while that with x k will be last. The probability that the system is in state k, P k (t), is then the integral of
Whilst it is perhaps more natural to index the pdf for (say) state k = 1 by the time of the most recent failure t 1 rather than by x 1 =  + t 1 -t, the latter is chosen as the remaining repair times x 1 are defined on the finite range [0, ] and, for small , expansions in x 1 are simpler than in t -t 1 . This is in fact more important in the quadruplex case considered elsewhere [35] .
In terms of these probabilities and density functions, the system state-equations are
Eq. (30i) describes the transitions out of state k = 0 and may be derived in a manner similar to eq. (5); (30ii) describes the balance in state k (1  k  N-3); (30iii) refers to state k = N -2 (different from eq. (30ii) as there is no transition out of the failed state k = N-1) and may be derived in a similar manner to eq. (7); finally (30iv) describes transitions into the failed state, k = N-1 and plays the role eq. (9) plays for the triplex case. The continuity conditions at the states boundaries are
The first of these plays the role of eq. (3) in the triplex case. The second performs the same task at the other state boundaries. Eqs. (31) ensure that the system correctly enters state k + 1 correctly when a failure occurs in state k. The system reliability R S (t), MTTFF and failure time distribution f S (t) are given by, respectively, 6). Comparison of the DDE solution, using the MATLAB ddesd routine 33, 34 , and the small repair-time approximate solution (eq. (41) with N = 3) for the failure distribution of a 2-out-of-3:G system, each of whose components have the bath-tub type failure-rate given in eq. (29) . The numerical solution is represented by the solid line while the dotted curve corresponds to eq. (41). Also shown for comparison is the system failure distribution assuming a constant failure rate equal to that at the bottom of the bath-tub curve (dash-dotted line).
Generally for a 2-out-of-N:G system, with a fast replacement facility, i.e. small repair time , it will be admissible to expand )
. This yields, for 0 ≤ x k ≤ ,
so that, integrating over the ordered set X N-2 , 18 
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In changing from derivatives with respect to x k , to those with respect to t, we have used eqs. (30ii). This introduces, in the summation, terms in )
). This latter term is of O((t)) compared to the former and at this level of approximation may be ignored. We have also used repeatedly, from eqs. (31),
Clearly from eqs. (31i), (34) and (35), P k (t) ~ O((t) k  k ) and as a consequence the reliability may also be approximated from eq. (32i) as
Notice also that, from eqs. (32iii), (34) 
Combining eqs. (32iii), (34) , (36) and (37)
Integrating this then gives
The first factor in eq. (39) represents the fact that eq. (36) is only accurate to O((t)) and also absorbs the second term in eq. (38). It is clearly possible to ignore this factor when t/MTTFF is significantly greater than around (t). In this case the system may be described by an instantaneous hazard rate of
The analysis presented so far is in line with that of Solov"yev and Zaytsev who suggested 16 that, for systems with sufficiently small repair times , if the system reliability R S (t) behaves as exp(-h S0 (,)t) for constant  (i. e. MTTFF = 1/h S0 (,) as in eq. (12)) then it can be expected that, for time varying (t), R S (t) and represents a slightly more accurate result than that of eq. (19) . It may in fact be derived by retaining the second order term in 2 / ) t ( C 2    in eq. (16) . We should note that it has been assumed here that the Taylor series for C(t -) can be truncated after the first two terms. This requires a relatively slowly changing function C(t) over intervals of length . Indeed ) t ( C   is only small compared to C(t), from eq. (17), with small (t), provided that ) t (   / 2 (t) ~ O(1). Thus, the method of Diver 25 is expected to fail for failure rates which change too rapidly. The DDE solution for the triplex TTFF distribution is compared with the approximate solution obtained above, eqs. (39) and (40), in Fig.(6) . Also shown is the exponential distribution with a constant rocof equal to the value of (t) at the bottom of the bath-tub curve. The solutions are indistinguishable for this case as (t) is small, so that eqs. (39) and (40) are likely to represent a very good approximation for most realistic safety-critical (small (t)) systems. For larger (t) the DDE solver is recommended.
For HPP flows in a 2-out-of-N:G system (N-plex redundancy), with small , MTTFF N is then given by the asymptotic expression Using eq. (41) it is possible, for example, to choose the level of redundancy in the active suspension unit to give an MTTFF for that system which will not interfere with the running operation of the parent railway vehicle. Alternatively using eq. (40) one can choose N to ensure that the overall hazard rate is kept within some acceptable value. Thus if  = 1/416 days -1 ,  = 7 days and if it is required that MTTFF is 500,000 h as in Ref. 22 , a triplex system (N = 3) will give an MTTFF of around 99,000 h while a quadruplex system (N=4) will give an MTTFF of around 2,900,000 h. Clearly only a quadruplex system will provide the required reliability.
Conclusions
We have considered the failure of general 2-out-of-N:G systems, with component failures determined by a time-dependent rocof (t). The problem definition reflects two possible cases. The analysis corresponds to either the case that an environmental variable causes a common time-dependent acceleration of the single-component rocof, or the components age with rocof (t) but undergo a fast, minimal repair. There is a requirement that Maintenance Engineers complete replacements within some maximum time  which includes any transportation time. As the system is assumed to be safety-critical, this maximum value is assumed for all repairs. In the former case, where the time-variation is due to an environmental change, the Maintenance Schedule must include a regular replacement of components so that failures due to component ageing processes may be excluded. Consequently their time-dependent failure rate (t) is assumed to come from other sources such as general degradation of irreplaceable system components placing additional loading onto subsystem components. In the latter case the repair time  is assumed sufficiently small that minimal repair is a reasonable approximation.
In either of these cases, the TTFF reliability function and hazard rate are determined approximately by eqs. (39) and (40), while the specific case of triplex redundancy is considered in more detail. For a constant single component failure rate (t) =  (constant), the triplex MTTFF is given by eq. (24) and the TTFF distribution by eq. (22) . In the case of a more general time-dependent failure rate with NHPP flows, the failure time distribution is governed by the solution of a first order differential-delay equation (DDE), the analytical solutions of which are extremely complex even for simple cases. Such DDE equations are generally suitable only for numerical methods and an illustration case assuming a bath-tub like single component failure rate, using Shampine"s ddesd function 33, 34 (written for MATLAB), is covered in some detail. Using this method the system hazard rate h S (t) for any (t) may be calculated and a redundancy may readily be chosen that will ensure that the hazard rate is kept within prescribed bounds, or that the MTTFF is sufficiently long.
